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“JUST CLICK HERE”: A BRIEF GLANCE AT  
ABSURD ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS AND THE 
LAW FAILING TO PROTECT CONSUMERS
MIKE BEISHUIZEN†
ABSTRACT
As e-commerce explodes around the world, consumers’ rights have 
been left behind. Before the completion of virtually every transaction 
on the Internet, the onus is placed on consumers to read and agree to 
an onslaught of terms and conditions. Often hidden in the middle of this 
extremely lengthy list of terms are massive exemption and limitation of 
liability clauses that deny consumers most if not all of their rights as 
“equal” trading partners. The common law principle that all onerous 
clauses in a contract need to be brought to the attention of the consumer 
for them to be binding seems to have been lost with the invention of the 
“click here to agree” button for signing online contracts. As the courts 
in Canada have not provided clear guidance on this issue thus far, other 
means must be pursued in order to protect consumers from the near-
tyrannical control of unencumbered electronic standard form contracts 
LQHFRPPHUFH7KLVSDSHUZLOOGHVFULEHWKHSULQFLSOHRIVXIÀFLHQF\RI
notice as it applies to paper contracts, and then contrast it with the 
newer jurisprudence that has refused to apply the principle to electronic 
contracts. The reasons for the refusal will be explored, followed by 
DQH[DPLQDWLRQRIZK\ WKHSULQFLSOHRI VXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFHQHHGV WR
be applied and strengthened to respond to the increasingly onerous 
provisions hidden in electronic contracts. Finally, some other options 
for achieving the goal of consumer protection from hidden onerous 
FODXVHVZLOOEHEULHÁ\H[SORUHG7KHVHRWKHURSWLRQVLQFOXGHLQWURGXFLQJ
stiffer consumer protection legislation domestically, the creation of 
international treaties, developing voluntary standards of contracting, 
and relying on Internet self-regulation.
† Mike Beishuizen (B.A., University of British Columbia) will enter his third year at Dalhousie 
Law School in September 2005.  He would like to thank Professor Devlin, Professor Ogua-
manam and Steve Beishuizen for their kind support and advice in the writing of this paper. 
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I. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE HAS NOT BEEN 
APPLIED TO ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS 
1. Paper Contracts
The basic rule in analyzing the legal force of any contract is that if the 
parties signed it, they will be bound by it.1 In the widely accepted case 
of L’Estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd., Lord Scrutton stated that: 
[W]hen a document containing contractual terms is signed, then, 
in the absence of fraud, or I will add, misrepresentation, the party 
signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read 
the document or not.2 
The potential for misrepresentation is far greater in standard form con-
tracts since there is generally no negotiation or discussion of the terms 
between the parties prior to signing. 
&DQDGLDQ FRXUWV KDYH EHHQ RSHQ WR ÀQGLQJPLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV LQ
standard form contracts. Professor Waddams of the University of To-
ronto stated:
[Several cases subsequent to L’Estrange] suggest that there is a 
special onus on the supplier to point out any terms in a printed form 
which differ from what the consumer might reasonably expect. 
If he fails to do so, he will be guilty of a “misrepresentation by 
omission”, and the court will strike down clauses which “differ from 
the ordinary understanding of mankind” or (and sometimes this is 
the same thing) clauses which are “unreasonable or oppressive”.3
The Ontario Court of Appeal explicitly approved this statement of the 
law in Tilden-Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning.4 In addition, Dubin J.A., 
speaking for the majority of the Court in Tilden, elaborated upon the 
previous test by concluding that:
1 L’Estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd., [1934] 2 K.B. 394 (C.A.).
2 Ibid. at 403.
3 Steven Waddams, comment, (1971) 49 Can. Bar Rev. 578 at 590, cited in Tilden Rent-A-Car 
Co. v. Clendenning (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400 (Ont. C.A.), 18 O.R. (2d) 601 (C.A.) [Tilden 
cited to D.L.R.].
4 Tilden, supra note 3.
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In many cases the parties seeking to rely on the terms of the contract 
know or ought to know that the signature of a party to the contract 
does not represent the true intention of the signer, and that the 
party signing is unaware of the stringent and onerous provisions 
which the standard form contains. Under such circumstances, I am 
of the opinion that the party seeking to rely on such terms should 
QRWEHDEOHWRGRVRLQWKHDEVHQFHRIÀUVWKDYLQJWDNHQUHDVRQDEOH
measures to draw such terms to the attention of the other party, and, 
in the absence of such reasonable measures, it is not necessary for 
the party denying knowledge of such terms to prove either fraud, 
misrepresentation or non est factum.5
Since businesses should know that consumers rarely read part or all of a 
contract,6 this rule basically means that onerous terms in standard form 
contracts will not be binding unless reasonable measures are taken to 
bring them to the attention of the consumer. The decision in Tilden has 
been generally accepted by courts in most Canadian jurisdictions,7 thus 
bringing Canadian common law in line with previous British jurispru-
dence.8 Tilden has not been overruled and is still an accurate statement 
of the law in Canada today for standard form paper contracts. However, 
the rule has not been applied to electronic contracts in Canada thus far.
2. Electronic Contracts
i) Rudder v. Microsoft
In the 1999 decision of Rudder v. Microsoft,9 consumers in Ontario at-
tempted to bring a class action lawsuit against Microsoft Network on 
behalf of approximately 89,000 Canadians, claiming that Microsoft had 
5 Tilden, supra note 3, at 408-409.
6 See Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Cent-
rale, [1966] 2 All E.R. 61 (H.L.) at 76, where Lord Reid stated, in reference to standard form 
contracts, that “the customer has no time to read them, and, if he did read them, he would prob-
ably not understand them.”
7 See Delaney v. Cascade River Holidays Ltd. (1983), 44 B.C.L.R. 24 (C.A.), 24 C.C.L.T. 6 
(B.C.C.A.) [Delaney]; see also Toronto Blue Jays Baseball Club v. John Doe (1992), 9 O.R. 
(3d) 622 (Gen. Div.).
8 See Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd., [1971] 2 Q.B. 163, [1971] 1 All E.R. 686 (C.A.); see 
also Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd., [1989] 1 Q.B. 433, [1988] 
1 All E.R. 348 (C.A.).
9 [1999] O.J. No. 3778 (Sup. Ct.).
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misappropriated their funds. The Ontario Superior Court dismissed the 
case as being out of their jurisdiction by upholding the forum selec-
tion and choice of law clause in the electronically-signed, “click here to 
agree”-type Microsoft Network account-opening agreement. The fairly 
typical clause that Rudder failed notice stated:
This Agreement is governed by the laws of the State of Washington, 
U.S.A., and you consent to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of 
courts in King County, Washington, in all disputes arising out of or 
relating to your use of MSN or your MSN membership.10 
The Court found that even though the clause was not particularly well 
GLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPWKHUHVWRIWKHFRQWUDFWLWZDVQRWHTXLYDOHQWWR´ÀQH
print” in a paper contract, and therefore should be given effect. Perhaps 
to justify this slight deviation in the law, Winkler J. then stated that “fo-
rum selection clauses are generally treated with a measure of deference 
by Canadian courts.”11 At best, Rudder does not reject the application 
of Tilden in electronic contracts, it merely carves out an exception for 
forum selection and choice of law clauses. 
However, the decision in Rudder is particularly troubling beyond 
WKLVVLPSOHH[FHSWLRQ:LQNOHU-UXOHGWKDWWKHUHZDVVXIÀFLHQWQRWLFH
of terms because “all of the terms of the agreement [were] displayed in 
the same format…in other words, there [was] no ÀQHSULQW as that term 
ZRXOGEHGHÀQHGLQDZULWWHQGRFXPHQWµ>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@12 Winkler 
J. seems to have missed the point that the size constraints of paper con-
WUDFWVWKDWSURGXFHWKHQHHGIRUÀQHSULQWDUHLQKHUHQWO\QRWSUHVHQWLQ
electronic contracts. This is irrelevant for notice, however, as the Tilden 
rule requires more than simply notSODFLQJRQHURXVWHUPVLQÀQHSULQWLW
requires that companies take “reasonable measures to draw such terms 
to the attention of the other party.”13 To emphasize the difference be-
tween these two concepts, it is useful to examine the Microsoft Network 
agreement as it exists today.
To sign up for a Microsoft Network account, which is mandatory for 
using a Hotmail account, users are required to consent to four contrac-
10 Ibid. at para. 5.
11 Supra note 9 at para. 8.
12 Supra note 9 at para. 14.
13 Supra note 3 at 408-409.
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tual agreements.14 These agreements form a combined 52 pages of terms 
and conditions. Among these terms is a condition that “it is the express 
will of the parties that this agreement and all related documents have 
been drawn up in English”; another that states “YOU SPECIFICAL-
LY AGREE THAT MICROSOFT SHALL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO OR ALTERATION OF YOUR 
TRANSMISSIONS OR DATA”. Finally, of course, there is the all-en-
compassing exemption of liability clause: “IN NO EVENT SHALL MI-
CROSOFT AND/OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR…[followed 
by 22 lines totally exempting Microsoft from any conceivable liability, 
whatsoever].”15 
Of the approximately 2,100 printed lines in these combined agree-
ments, 115 lines are in capital letters and 18 are in bold font. Interest-
ingly enough, essentially the same forum selection and choice of law 
clause from Rudder is found inconspicuously in the middle of two of the 
four agreements, both times in regular font. No bold font, no capital let-
ters. Surely this is not adequate notice of a clause that in essence denies 
consumers the practical right to sue Microsoft. Yet the Rudder decision 
VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHUHLVVXIÀFLHQWQRWLFHIRUWKLVDQGHYHU\RWKHUFODXVHLQ
the 52-page agreement simply because there are no terms printed in less 
than 12-point font. 
ii) Kanitz et al. v. Rogers Cable Inc. 
The reasoning in Rudder was subsequently followed and expanded upon 
by the same Ontario Superior Court in Kanitz et al. v. Rogers Cable 
Inc.16 In this case the Court enforced an arbitration clause that was elec-
tronically added to a contract after it was signed. The clause effectively 
denied consumers the right to pursue a class action lawsuit against Rog-
ers. In his reasons, Nordheimer J. also distinguished the Tilden rule as 
RQO\DSSO\LQJWRÀQHSULQWVWDWLQJWKDWWKHDUELWUDWLRQFODXVHZDV´HDV-
ily located by anyone who wishes to take the time to scroll through the 
14 See online: Microsoft Network <http://registernet.passport.net>. These agreements are the 
Hotmail Service Agreement, MSN Privacy Statement, Passport Terms of Use, and the Passport 
Statement of Privacy.
15 “Hotmail Service Agreement,” online: Microsoft Network <https://registernet.passport.net/
images/HMSA_1033.html>.
16 [2002] O.J. No. 665, 58 O.R. (3d) 299 (Sup. Ct.) [Kanitz].
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GRFXPHQWµDQGWKDW LWZDV´WKHUHIRUHQRWDWDOOHTXLYDOHQW WR WKHÀQH
print on the back of the rent-a-car contract in the Tilden case.”17 
What is more disturbing about Kanitz, however, is that Nordheimer 
J. found that consumers had been given adequate notice of the after-
added clause simply because the original contract allowed Rogers to 
“change, modify, add or remove portions of the agreement”,18 and be-
cause notice that amendments were made had been given to consumers. 
This notice consisted of a posted a message on the Rogers website and 
an email to its customers saying that Rogers had changed the terms of 
the agreement. Neither notice gave any further details as to how the 
agreement had been altered. Nordheimer J. stated that this constituted 
VXIÀFLHQW QRWLFH HYHQ WKRXJK LW UHTXLUHG FRQVXPHUV WR FOLFN WKURXJK
ÀYHVFUHHQVIURPWKH5RJHUVKRPHSDJHDQGUHUHDGWKHHQWLUHDPHQGHG
DJUHHPHQWLQDQDWWHPSWWRÀJXUHRXWZKDWWHUPVKDGFKDQJHG
This poses a tremendous burden on consumers, as the same Rogers 
End User Agreement that was in contention in Kanitz is a whopping 
ten single-spaced pages in length today.19 Considering that the average 
consumer has ongoing contracts with one or two email providers, their 
Internet service provider, telephone provider, credit card companies, 
banks, lease companies and a whole host of other companies, requiring 
them to re-read ten or 52 page-long agreements every time a change has 
been made to any of them is impractical, unrealistic and inequitable. 
The far more equitable alternative would be to simply require that com-
panies provide consumers with a list of the exact amendments that they 
have made, drawing special attention to any onerous amendments.
Rudder and Kanitz are the only two cases in Canada thus far that 
KDYHDGGUHVVHG WKH VXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFH LQHOHFWURQLFFRQWUDFWV%RWK
of the decisions have been adopted for peripheral reasons in other judg-
ments;20 however, due to the limited jurisdictional and precedential 
value of Ontario Superior Court decisions, this is not considered to be 
settled law in Canada. In contrast, the law is more settled in the United 
States.
17 Ibid. at para. 31.
18 Ibid. at para. 18.
19 “End User Agreement,” online: Rogers Yahoo! Hi-Speed Internet Services <http://na.edit.
client.yahoo.com/rogers/show_static?.form=eua>.
20 See MacKinnon v. National Money Mart Co., [2004] B.C.J. No. 1961 at para. 28 (C.A.), 2004 
BCCA 473; see also Noble v. Noble, [2002] O.J. No. 4996 at Para. 23 (Sup. Ct.). 
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iii) American Jurisprudence
The common law in the United States contains a rule similar to that in 
Tilden, although not as stringent, which requires that onerous clauses 
be “reasonably communicated” to consumers.21 However, the same dis-
missal of this requirement in electronic contracts as seen in Canada is 
also seen in American jurisprudence. The D.C. Superior Court in For-
rest v. Verizon Communications22 GHFLGHGWKDWWKHUHZDVVXIÀFLHQWQR-
tice of a forum selection clause that was written in regular font in the 
middle of a 13-page agreement. The Court determined that adequate 
notice had been given simply because at the top of the agreement Veri-
zon had written “PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENT 
CAREFULLY.”23 This decision is probably attributable to the weaker 
American notice requirement. For example, a similarly-worded paper 
ticket stating, “IMPORTANT PLEASE READ FOLLOWING TERMS 
OF PASSAGE CONTRACT” has also been found to adequately no-
tify passengers of onerous terms in a shipping company’s paper-based 
agreement.24 
Although several courts have hesitantly refused to enforce shrink-
wrap agreements25 in the United States,26 none so far has refused to ac-
knowledge terms in an electronic contract because of the lack of no-
tice.27 Therefore, just like in Rudder and Kanitz in Canada, a distinction 
21 See Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Lieb v. Royal Caribbean 
Cruise Line, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 
L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118, 732 A.2d 528 (App. Div. 1999), where in a case almost identical in 
facts and outcome to Rudder, supra note 9, the forum selection clause in Microsoft Networks’s 
User Agreement was deemed to have been reasonably communicated. 
22 805 A.2d 1007, 2002 D.C. App. LEXIS 509 (D.C. Super. Ct.) [Verizon cited to A.2d].
23 Ibid. at 1010.
24 Melnik v. Cunard Line Ltd., 875 F. Supp. 103, 107 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Cooper v. Carni-
val Cruise Lines, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8054, 1992 WL 137012 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
25 Kevin W. Grierson, “Enforceability of “clickwrap” or “shrinkwrap” agreements common 
in computer software, hardware and internet transactions” 106 A.L.R.(5th) 309 at footnote 2 
GHÀQHVWKLVWHUP´$´VKULQNZUDSµDJUHHPHQWFRQVLVWVRIZULWWHQFRQGLWLRQVRQDFDUGRUSDSHU
sheet which appears when the user opens packaged hardware or software, which card or sheet 
purports to condition use of the hardware or software on the user’s implicit agreement to abide 
E\WKHFRQGLWLRQVVSHFLÀHGWKHUHRQµ
26 See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1059 (D. Kan. 
2000); see also Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 22 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d 70 (D. Ariz. 1993).
27 See Grierson, supra QRWHIRUDWKRURXJKOLVWRI$PHULFDQFDVHVWKDWKDYHVKRZQVXIÀFLHQW
notice in “clickwrap” agreements.
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has been drawn in the United States between notice in paper contracts 
and notice in electronic ones. An accurate description of the current law 
of electronic contracts in the United States is stated in Verizon, which 
notes that “absent fraud or mistake, one who signs [an electronic] con-
tract is bound by a contract which he has an opportunity to read whether 
he does so or not.”28
3. Unconscionability
It is important to note that consumers are still protected from exceeding-
ly onerous terms in electronic standard form contracts by the doctrine 
of substantive unconscionability. In Robet v. Versus Brokerage Services 
Inc. (c.o.b. E*Trade Canada),29 consumers lost money because of an er-
ror in E-Trade’s online trading system. The defendant claimed that their 
extremely onerous electronic contract absolved them of liability. Using 
the principles set out in Tilden, the plaintiff claimed that there was a 
ODFNRIVXIÀFLHQWQRWLFHRIWKHUHOHYDQWOLDELOLW\H[HPSWLRQFODXVHV7KH
Ontario Superior Court found for the plaintiff. However, in doing so it 
GLGQRWUHIHUWRHLWKHUWKHSULQFLSOHRIVXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFHRUWKHTilden 
decision in its reasoning. In fact, the Court was extremely vague in de-
scribing why it did not allow the exclusion clauses to take effect. 
The Court seemed to base its decision on the utter unreasonable-
ness of some of the terms in the contract. Wilkins J. notes sarcastically 
that “the wording of clause 16(h) of the agreement is almost such as to 
constitute the creation of a license fee for the defendant to be reckless 
in its provision of services.”30+HWKHQJRHVRQWRVWDWHWKDW´WKHGLIÀ-
culty I have with the case at bar, is that the wording of the contractual 
arrangement would appear to be broad enough to encompass almost any 
form of activity which might be engaged in by the defendant which, in 
effect, could defeat the very purpose and intention of the overall rela-
tionship between the parties.”31 According to this reasoning, it seems 
that Wilkins J.’s decision is based more on a vague application of the 
28 Nickens v. Labor Agency of Metro. Washington, 600 A.2d 813, 817 n.2 (D.C. 1991), as cited 
in supra note 22 at 1010.
29 [2001] O.J. No. 1341, [2001] O.T.C. 232 (Sup. Ct.) [Robet].
30 Ibid. at para. 58.
31 Ibid.  at para. 61.
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doctrine of substantive unconscionability32 than on the very different 
SULQFLSOHRIVXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFHWKDWZDVDGYDQFHGE\Tilden.33 Soon 
after the Robet decision, in 2002 the California District Court explicitly 
found substantive unconscionability in the electronically-signed con-
tract in Comb v. Paypal, Inc.34 
The Court in Comb found that an arbitration clause that was added 
to the agreement after it was signed was substantively unconscionable. 
The Court stated that “although it is true that forum selection clauses 
generally are presumed prima facie valid, a forum selection clause may 
be unconscionable if the “place or manner” in which arbitration is to oc-
cur is unreasonable taking into account “the respective circumstances of 
the parties.”35$IWHUÀQGLQJWKDWWKHDUELWUDWLRQFODXVHZDVXQFRQVFLRQ-
able, the Court found it unnecessary to address the issue of whether the 
FODXVHZDVVXIÀFLHQWO\EURXJKWWRWKHSODLQWLII·VDWWHQWLRQ5HJDUGOHVV
the decisions in both Robet and Comb serve to demarcate the outer lim-
its of onerous terms that will be allowed in electronic contracts through 
the doctrine of unconscionability and without reference to the principle 
RIVXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFH
II. WHY THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE HAS NOT 
BEEN APPLIED TO ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS
7KHUHDUHWKUHHPDLQUHDVRQVZK\WKHSULQFLSOHRIVXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFH
has not been applied to electronic contracts in Canada so far. First, there 
is an erroneous assumption that consumers have more time to read the 
contents of contracts when they are displayed on their home computers. 
6HFRQGFRXUWVLQ&DQDGDKDYHDOVRHUURQHRXVO\FRQÀQHGWKHSULQFLSOH
RIVXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFHWRFRQWUDFWVZLWKÀQHSULQW$QGWKLUGQRQHRI
32 See Fraser Jewellers (1982) Ltd. V. Dominion Electric Protection Co. (1997), 148 D.L.R. 
(4th) 496 (Ont. C.A.) for an application of the doctrine of unconscionability in a similar fact 
situation.
33 See Zhu v. Merrill Lynch HSBC, [2002] B.C.J. No. 2883, 2002 BCPC 535 [Zhu] where in an 
extremely similar case, the British Columbia Provincial Court adopted the outcome of Robet, 
yet was equally ambiguous as to whether the result was because of unconscionable terms or 
EHFDXVHRIDODFNRIVXIÀFLHQWQRWLFH
34 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (Cal. D.).
35 Ibid. at 1177.
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the cases advanced in Canada so far have provided an obvious opportu-
nity to utilize the principle.
1. Rushed Contracts
In the past, Canadian courts have been sympathetic to consumers who 
have been rushed into signing standard form contracts with onerous li-
ability release clauses.36 It seems natural to assume that this situation 
is effectively avoided when consumers contract electronically from the 
FRPIRUWRIWKHLUKRPHFRPSXWHUV6XSHUÀFLDOO\WKLVDVVXPSWLRQSDUWO\
explains why the principle in Tilden has not been applied to electronic 
contracts.37 However, this assumption is erroneous.
One of the reasons for the Internet’s sweeping success is that it al-
lows rushed consumers to purchase goods and services quickly and eas-
ily. Much of the time, if consumers weren’t so rushed, they would be 
shopping at stores and malls instead of on the Internet. Companies that 
do business online are highly aware of this. In fact, they know that their 
RQOLQHEXVLQHVVGHSHQGVRQWKHHIÀFLHQF\DQGVSHHGRIWKHWUDQVDFWLRQ
This is why most online businesses place their terms and conditions on 
a separate page, hyper-linked to the agreement. While hyper-linking the 
terms of a contract placates rushed consumers, it should constitute mis-
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQE\RPLVVLRQRUDODFNRIVXIÀFLHQWQRWLFHDVLWFUHDWHVWKH
illusion of a simple contract with no onerous terms. At a very minimum, 
the whole contract should be displayed for the consumer before agree-
ment is made. This would at least ensure that rushed consumers do not 
entirely miss the fact that there is a long list of terms in the contract.
2. Fine Print
In both Kanitz and Rudder, the Ontario Superior Court found that con-
VXPHUVKDGEHHQJLYHQVXIÀFLHQWQRWLFHRI WKHRQHURXVFODXVHV LQ WKH
HOHFWURQLF FRQWUDFWV SULPDULO\ EHFDXVH WKH\ ZHUH QRW ZULWWHQ LQ ÀQH
36 See Tilden, supra note 3; see also Delaney, supra note 7.
37 George Takash, author of Computer Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), suggested in 
an oral conversation with me on December 9th, 2004 that this is probably the main policy reason 
as to why Canadian courts have been reluctant to extend the principle in Tilden to electronic 
contracts. 
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print. As discussed earlier, this is not a correct application of the prin-
ciple in Tilden, which requires that “reasonable measures” be taken to 
draw onerous terms to the attention of the other party.38 While not writ-
LQJRQHURXVWHUPVLQÀQHSULQWPD\EHFRQVLGHUHGWREHD´UHDVRQDEOH
measure” in some circumstances, it certainly cannot mean that it will 
be considered reasonable in every circumstance. For example, printing 
an onerous term plainly in regular font at the top of a one-page long 
contract will usually be seen as being adequate notice of that term. In 
contrast, placing that same onerous term in regular font in the middle 
of a 52-page agreement can hardly be seen as a reasonable measure to 
draw the term to the attention of the other party. The Court in Kanitz 
and Rudder failed to make this logical extension, and therefore failed to 
understand and apply the precedential logic from Tilden correctly.
3. Lack of Suitable Plaintiffs
The third possible reason why courts in Canada haven’t applied the 
principle in Tilden to electronic contracts is because none of the cases 
thus far has presented a compelling fact situation to which the courts 
might feel sympathetic. 
Rudder was a case brought by two recent law school graduates for 
75 million dollars. The Court likely presumed that because of their legal 
education, these students were not innocent, unequal partners to the bar-
gain as compared to ordinary consumers with no legal training.39 Also, 
the Court may have seen the claim for 75 million dollars in damages as a 
money and publicity grab rather than a ERQDÀGH instance of a powerless 
consumer unwittingly consenting to onerous conditions – the situation 




the amended End User Agreement. However, the Court simply did not 
EHOLHYH´WKHSODLQWLIIV·FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQDVWRWKHPDJQLWXGHRIGLIÀFXOW\
LQYROYHG LQÀQGLQJ WKHXVHUDJUHHPHQWµ40 because the plaintiff had a 
38 Tilden, supra note 3 at 408-409.
39 Teresa Scassa & Michael Deturbide, Electronic Commerce and Internet Law in Canada, (To-
ronto: CCH, 2004) at 14.
40 Supra note 16 at para. 28.
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Master’s degree in computer science and should have been familiar with 
browsing through websites using the method of trial and error.
In the most blatant dismissal of an action so far, in 1267623 Ontario 
Inc. v. Nexx Online Inc.,41 the Ontario Superior Court denied a company 
the right to send 200,000 pieces of SPAM per day from their account even 
though it was not expressly forbidden in the agreement with their serv-
ice provider. The question of whether the service provider had given 
VXIÀFLHQWQRWLFHRIWKLVSURKLELWLRQGLGQRWHYHQDSSHDUDVDQLVVXHLQ
WKH MXGJPHQWGHVSLWH LWVFOHDUVLJQLÀFDQFH WR WKHFDVH7KLV LVDSSDU-
ently because the Court was so opposed to the idea of letting a spam-
ming company continue to operate that it actually cited an article named 
“Why is Spam Bad?”42 in its reasons.
As eCommerce expands to encompass new industries, a new trend 
LQ FDVHV LQYROYLQJ ERQD ÀGH FRPSODLQWV IURP RUGLQDU\ FRQVXPHUV LV
emerging. The evidence of this trend is already apparent in the up-turn 
in lawsuits against online brokerages. However, as discussed, the two 
cases that have been decided in this area so far have not needed to deal 
GLUHFWO\ZLWKWKHLVVXHRIVXIÀFLHQWQRWLFHDVWKHWHUPVLQWKRVHDJUHH-
ments were so unquestionably onerous that they were struck out for a 
reason resembling unconscionability.43 
III. WHY THE PRINCIPLE IN TILDEN NEEDS TO BE 
STRENGTHENED AND APPLIED TO ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS
7KHSULQFLSOHRIVXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFHQHHGVWREHDSSOLHGDQGVWUHQJWK-
ened for use in electronic contracts for four reasons. First, electronic 
contracts are generally much lengthier than paper contracts. Second, 
there are usually no company representatives available to point out and 
clarify onerous terms in electronic contracts prior to signing. Third, as 
consumers rarely read or fully understand long contracts, a new approach 
is needed to ensure that a true meeting of the minds has taken place. And 
fourth, most retail stores doing business on the Internet do not currently 
41 45 O.R. (3d) 40, [1999] O.J. No. 2246.
42 John Levine, “Why is Spam Bad?”, online: Fight Spam on the Internet! <http://spam.abuse.
net/overview/spambad.shtml>. 
43 See Robet, supra note 29; also see Zhu, supra note 33.
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require that customers explicitly accept any of the terms that are placed 
on the transaction, relying instead on the clickwrap button. 
1. Longer Electronic Contracts 
Electronic contracts are generally longer than paper contracts because 
they are less constrained by size and cost, they have less of a psycho-
logical effect on consumers, and they need to address potential legal 
challenges from multiple legal regimes around the world. The princi-
SOHRIVXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFHVKRXOGEHFRPHPRUHDQGPRUHUHOHYDQWWKH
longer a contract gets, as it becomes easier for consumers to miss oner-
ous provisions. 
7KHÀUVW UHDVRQZK\HOHFWURQLFFRQWUDFWV WHQG WREH ORQJHU LV WKDW
they are cheaper than paper contracts. A proper economic analysis of 
the costs associated with contracting by paper as opposed to contract-
ing electronically has not been attempted by academics thus far, and is 
well beyond the scope of this paper. Yet it is obvious that the ink, paper, 
printing, maintenance and storage costs involved with paper contracts is 
far greater than the cost of purchasing a small amount of bandwidth and 
storage for electronic contracts.
Unconstrained by the prohibitive costs of using long paper contracts, 
businesses have generally expanded the size of their contracts for online 
users.44 This in turn increases the possibility that terms may be “hidden” 
in the contract, and therefore not adequately brought to the attention of 
consumers.
The second reason why electronic contracts tend to be longer than 
paper contracts is that consumers react differently to the two types of 
contracts. Consumers may be shocked out of pursuing a service agree-
ment or making repeat purchases from a store if they are asked to read 
and agree to the contents of a 52-page booklet of terms and conditions 
that is handed to them. In contrast, most electronic contracts would not 
44 See for example Futureshop, whose terms and conditions displayed in their stores are much 
shorter than the terms and conditions displayed on their website: “User Agreement,” online: 
<http://www.futureshop.ca/informationcentre/en/useagreement.asp> and “Online Policies,” 
online: Futureshop <http://www.futureshop.ca/informationcentre/en/onlinepolicies.asp>. Also 
compare the terms listed at Chapters-Indigo Books’ stores to the terms listed on their website: 
Chapters-Indigo online: <http://www.chapters.indigo.ca/article.asp?Section=home&ArtCode=
legal>.
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have this effect as they hyper-link the terms and conditions to the agree-
ment screen of the transaction. This simple-looking hyper-link obscures 
the reality of the often complex and extremely onerous set of terms that 
are present in the contract. The illusion created by hyper-linking allows 
companies to vastly lengthen their standard electronic contracts without 
much consumer backlash. This implicit deception creates a strong need 
WRDSSO\WKHSULQFLSOHRIVXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFHLQFDVHVZKHUHDJUHHPHQWV
do not adequately warn consumers that the hyper-link leads to a list of 
onerous conditions.
7KH WKLUG DQGÀQDO UHDVRQZK\ HOHFWURQLF FRQWUDFWV WHQG WREH VR
much lengthier than paper contracts is because of the globalized eCom-
merce marketplace. Most online businesses depend on their contracts to 
defend them against legal challenges that may arise under any jurisdic-
tion in the world. Forum and language selection clauses are therefore 
common in electronic contracts in addition to generally longer exclu-
sion and limitation clauses. 
With the length of electronic contracts expanding and almost com-
pletely unconstrained, the principle in Tilden may not be enough to pro-
tect consumers against excessively lengthy electronic contracts. This is 
because while MSNFRXOGFRQFHLYDEO\JLYHVXIÀFLHQWQRWLFHIRUHYHU\
onerous term in its 52-page account opening agreement, requiring con-
sumers to read 52 pages just to open an email account is completely 
unrealistic and unfair. Therefore, courts should extend the principle of 
VXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFHDQGXQFRQVFLRQDELOLW\LQJHQHUDOWRDSSO\WRH[FHV-
sively long electronic contracts, which should be deemed unconscion-
able regardless of the notice given. 
The determination of what makes a contract unconscionably long 
should be made on a case-by-case basis, with consideration given to the 
proportionality between the length of the contract and the complexity of 
the transaction. Factors that a court could use to analyse this proportion-
ality could include the total dollar amount of the transaction, the degree 
of repetition of terms in the contracts involved, and the inherent com-
plexity of the goods or services provided. To avoid rigidity in applying 
this new principle, an objective standard of reasonable proportionality 
should be adopted.
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2. No Human Presence
Companies have no human interaction with consumers when they con-
tract online. As electronic contracts typically utilize highly onerous and 
OHJDOLVWLF ODQJXDJH FRQVXPHUVPD\ QHHG WR KDYH WKH VLJQLÀFDQFH RI
VRPHWHUPVFODULÀHGEHIRUHWKH\IHHOFRPIRUWDEOHVLJQLQJ2IWHQKRZ-
HYHUWKHUHDUHQRRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUFODULÀFDWLRQDVVRPHFRPSDQLHVOLNH
Microsoft Network, do not post telephone numbers or email addresses 
for customer support services directly on their websites. This creates 
obvious problems for contracting in general, because if there is no sales 
representative from the company to point out and help clarify the terms 
RIDFRQWUDFWFRXUWVPD\ÀQGWKDWWKHUHZDVQRPHHWLQJRIWKHPLQGV
and therefore no agreement. This leads into the third reason why elec-
WURQLFFRQWUDFWVQHHGDVWUHQJWKHQHGSULQFLSOHRIVXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFH
many terms in these contracts are completely inaccessible to the average 
consumer.
3. Inaccessible Terms
In 1966, Lord Reid described the reality of standard form contracts in 
general by stating that “[usually] the customer has no time to read them, 
and, if he did read them, he would probably not understand them.”45 This 
statement was later quoted and approved by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
in Tilden. After making an identical assertion years later, Todd Rakoff 
added that “virtually every scholar who has written about contracts of 
adhesion has accepted the truth of this assertion, and the few empiri-
cal studies that have been done have agreed.”46 This widely accepted 
acknowledgement that consumers would not understand the terms of a 
contract even if they were to read it is extremely troubling.
&RXUWVVKRXOGHLWKHUH[SDQGWKHSULQFLSOHRIVXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFHRU
create a new legal principle that would strike down any terms in a con-
tract that are clearly inaccessible to consumers who do not have a legal 
background. New protection is more necessary now than ever before 
in dealing with standardized contracts signed online by unsuspecting 
45 Supra note 6 at 76.
46 Todd D. Rakoff, “Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,” (1983) 96 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1174 at 1179.
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consumers. This is because electronic contracts have gotten longer and 
more complex, and they usually lack the customer-service infrastruc-
WXUH WR KHOS FRQVXPHUVZKR GHPDQG FODULÀFDWLRQ RI YDJXH DQG LQDF-
cessible terms. The courts have probably not addressed this issue yet 
because eCommerce is in its infancy and there have been relatively few 
cases before the courts, none of which have yet dealt with a “typical” 
powerless plaintiff that the courts could feel truly sympathetic towards. 
However, it is inevitable that such plaintiffs will start to appear in court 
DIWHUVXIIHULQJUHDODQGTXDQWLÀDEOHGDPDJHVEHFDXVHRIRQHURXVWHUPV
in contracts that they could not reasonably have been expected to notice 
or understand – and at this point, the courts will be forced to address 
this issue. 
1R6XIÀFLHQW1RWLFHE\2QOLQH5HWDLO6WRUHV
At the moment, consumers make purchases from most of the Canadian 
stores that are online without ever being told that a list of terms applies 
to the transaction.47 Of course, there are often upwards of ten pages of 
terms and conditions that apply to most retail sales online. The burden 
is often placed on the consumer to notice that all of these terms are con-
tained in an inconspicuous 6.5-point font hyper-link entitled “Legal Notices and 
Terms of Use” at the bottom of the page.48 
Canadian retail stores doing business online probably show this 
ODFNDGDLVLFDODWWLWXGHWRZDUGVJLYLQJFRQVXPHUVVXIÀFLHQWQRWLFHRIRQ-
erous terms because the Canadian courts have failed to apply the princi-
ple in Tilden to electronic contracts thus far. If the principle was applied 
and adapted to the new circumstances surrounding electronic contracts, 
these online stores would be compelled to begin to behave in a more 
equitable manner towards consumers.
47 See online: Futureshop <http://www.futureshop.ca>; see also online: Chapters-Indigo <http://
www.chapters.indigo.ca>.
48 See Chapters-Indigo, supra note 44.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE ACTIONS THAT COULD BE TAKEN TO 
ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF CONSUMERS
Thus far, I have centred the discussion on the role of the courts in provid-
ing consumer protection online. However, there are several other means 
to achieve this same end. These means include government-imposed 
consumer protection, internationally-imposed consumer protection, 3rd 
SDUW\ VWDQGDUGV RI FRQWUDFWLQJ DQGÀQDOO\ ,QWHUQHW VHOIUHJXODWLRQ ,Q
WKLVVHFWLRQ,ZLOOEULHÁ\GHVFULEHHDFKRIWKHVHDOWHUQDWLYHPHDQVWKDW
could be taken and the drawbacks that each presents.
1. Government-Legislated Consumer Protection
Various jurisdictions across Canada have opted to enact consumer pro-
WHFWLRQOHJLVODWLRQVSHFLÀFDOO\WDUJHWHGDWHOHFWURQLFFRQWUDFWV7KLVSD-
per will discuss the relatively progressive Nova Scotia Consumer Pro-
tection Act.49 The Internet Sales Contract Regulations,50 which were 
made under the Act, list the key provisions relating to the notice of terms 
IRXQGLQDQRQOLQHVDOHVDJUHHPHQW6SHFLÀFDOO\WKHRegulations state:
(3) For the purposes of Section 21X of the Act, a supplier shall 
disclose the following information to a consumer before entering 
into an Internet sales contract with the consumer:
…
(i) the terms, conditions and method of payment
…
(m) any other restrictions, limitations or conditions of purchase that 
may apply. 51
The use of the term “shall disclose” is fairly vague. And since the Regu-
lations just came into force in December, 2003, Nova Scotian courts 
have not yet determined whether this implies that companies will be 
required to explicitly state the provisions of the agreement, or whether 
49 R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 92.
50 N.S. Reg. 91/2002.
51 Ibid. s. 3.
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LWZLOOVXIÀFHWRVLPSO\PDNHWKHWHUPVRIWKHDJUHHPHQWDYDLODEOHRQ
their website.
The more interesting provision in the Act states:
21Z(1) A supplier shall provide a consumer who enters into an 
internet sales contract with a copy of the contract in writing or 
HOHFWURQLF IRUP ZLWKLQ ÀIWHHQ GD\V DIWHU WKH FRQWUDFW LV HQWHUHG
into.52
The Regulations then follow up by stating:
5(1) A copy of an internet sales contract provided by a supplier 
pursuant to Section 21Z of the Act shall include 
(a) the information required by Section 3;… 53
In sum, these sections require companies contracting online to send 
FRQVXPHUVFRQÀUPDWLRQRIWKHFRQWUDFWZLWKLQGD\V7KLVFRQÀUPD-
tion “shall” include all of the items listed in section 3 of the Regulations, 
including “(i) the terms, conditions and method of payment” and “(m) 
any other restrictions, limitations or conditions of purchase that may 
apply.”54 
,WLVH[WUHPHO\UDUHIRUDFRQVXPHUWRUHFHLYHDFRQÀUPDWLRQHPDLO
that makes reference to any of the onerous terms in the contract. None of 
WKHFRQÀUPDWLRQHPDLOVWKDW,KDYHSHUVRQDOO\UHFHLYHGLQWKHSDVWIURP
Chapters.Indigo.ca, Amazon.com, or from Powells.com have made any 
implicit or explicit reference to any restrictions, limitations or condi-
tions, or even to general terms of use or terms of sale. Each of these 
companies imposes forum selection, arbitration and substantial limita-
tion of liability clauses. These clauses are only accessible by clicking 
on the six- to eight-point font “Terms of Use” or “Conditions of Use” 
hyper-link at the bottom of the page on each company’s website.55 
The main shortcoming of the Nova Scotia Consumer Protection Act 
is the limited scope of remedies that it provides. The only remedy that 
52 Ibid. s. 21Z (1).
53 Ibid. s. 5(1).
54 Ibid. s. 3.
55 See for example online: Powells <http://www.Powells.com>; online: Chapters-Indigo <http://
www.chapters.indigo.ca>; and online: Amazon at <http://www.amazon.ca>.
ABSURD CONTRACTS . . . 53 
the Act makes available to consumers if a seller does not comply with s. 
21Z(1) is the right to cancel the contract.56 There are no punitive dam-
ages awarded to deter companies from contracting in violation of the 
Act as their standard practice. This solution will also be hindered by the 
inherent limitation of creating legislation to address problems. It often 
takes years to implement legislation due to bureaucratic delays, and it 
LVH[WUHPHO\GLIÀFXOW WR UHDFK WKHFRQVHQVXVDFURVVHYHU\ MXULVGLFWLRQ
necessary to make the legislation truly effective. 
If the courts in Canada continue to reject the application of princi-
ple in Tilden to electronic contracts, governments will be increasingly 
SUHVVXUHGWRHQDFWVWURQJHUFRQVXPHUSURWHFWLRQOHJLVODWLRQWRÀOOLQWKH
gaps in law.
2. Internationally-Imposed Consumer Protection
It is clear that international agreements concerning eCommerce thus far 
have been focused almost exclusively on the logistics of establishing 
a workable and reliable globalized marketplace on the Internet.57 No 
PDMRULQWHUQDWLRQDODJUHHPHQWVKDYHDGGUHVVHGWKHODZRIVXIÀFLHQF\RI
notice in electronic contracts yet. However, as most of the fundamental 
logistics of eCommerce have now been worked out, international bodies 
PD\PRYHWRDGGUHVVVSHFLÀFFRQVXPHUSURWHFWLRQLVVXHVQH[W
3. Third-Party-Created Standards of Contracting
Many international organizations set standards for different industries. 
The most widely known and used of these is the International Organi-
zation for Standardization (ISO). ISO creates standards to make systems 
PRUHHIÀFLHQWDQGFRPSDWLEOHDQGKDVFUHDWHGVWDQGDUGVIRUKXQGUHGV
of different industries from computer technology to shoe laces. Thus far, 
no international organization has attempted to develop a standard con-
tract for any particular consumer-based industry. The creation of such 
56 Supra note 51, s. 6(1)(a).
57 See the work of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN-
CITRAL), online: UNCITRAL <http://www.uncitral.org>; see also UNCITRAL, “Online: 
Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001),” online: <http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/
HOHFWFRPPOHOHFVLJHSGI!IRUDVSHFLÀFH[DPSOH
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standards, however, may be a partial solution to the problem of heavily 
onerous electronic contracts.
If standards were set for the format, basic contents, and allowable 
provisions in contracts in a certain industry, companies may choose to 
DGRSWWKHVWDQGDUG$VSHFLÀFH[DPSOHWKDWZRXOGDGGUHVVWKHSUREOHP
RILQVXIÀFLHQWQRWLFHLVWRPDNHDVWDQGDUGWKDWPDQGDWHVK\SHUOLQNHG
tables of contents at the top of electronic contracts. Such a standard 
would change the way contracts are viewed online by taking advan-
tage of the Internet’s inherent hierarchical structure. Some of the previ-
ously discussed problems with hyper-linking could easily be avoided 
by naming the hyper-links appropriately. For example, naming a hy-
SHUOLQN´DGGLWLRQDOSURYLVLRQVµZRXOGQRWJLYHVXIÀFLHQWQRWLFHWRDQ
onerous exclusion clause within; whereas naming the same hyper-link 
“X company is excluded from liability for doing Y activity” would give 
VXIÀFLHQWQRWLFH
Companies would adopt contractual standards to conform to indus-
try norms, eliminate uncertainty about the legality of its own contracts, 
and to vastly reduce the legal costs involved in independently creating 
DQGPDLQWDLQLQJLWVRZQFRQWUDFWV&RQVXPHUVZRXOGEHQHÀWIURPVWDQG-
ardization because with a quick glance at the ISO symbol at the top of an 
electronic contract they would know that there are no unconscionable 
terms, and no onerous clauses “hiding” in the middle of the contract. If 
applied correctly, standards would mitigate the fact that most consumers 
do not read contracts by effectively guaranteeing fair contracts.
The limitations of voluntary standards are obvious. Without adequate 
incentives and pressure, industry will not likely create these standards 
on their own. Also, because they are voluntary standards, there would 
be no substantial penalty for breaching the standard, or for failing to 
adopt the standard at all. 
ABSURD CONTRACTS . . . 55 
4. Internet Self-Regulation
Since none of the above-mentioned methods have come even close to 
effectively protecting the rights of consumers since the dawn of the In-
ternet, market forces in some industries have created an extremely ef-
fective system of self-regulation. The pioneering example of this system 
is eBay.58 
eBay works on a system of feedback between buyers and sellers. 
Everyone is required to open an account before they can take part in the 
marketplace of eBay. Every time a transaction takes place on eBay, the 
seller and buyer have the option to rate one another. Users can view the 
ratings and comments that every other user has received in the past. In 
short, if a seller on eBay tries to hold a buyer to onerous terms without 
ÀUVW JLYLQJ UHDVRQDEOH QRWLFH WKH EX\HUZLOO OLNHO\ JLYH WKDW VHOOHU D
QHJDWLYHUDWLQJDQGFRPSODLQLQWKHFRPPHQWÀHOG2WKHUSRWHQWLDOEX\-
ers will see this rating, and may choose to buy from another, who would 
XVXDOO\EHHDV\WRÀQGVLQFHH%D\DQG,QWHUQHWVLWHVOLNHLWSURYLGHDQ
almost perfectly elastic marketplace. 
eBay also provides a type of standard for sellers that consumers can 
trust. All sellers that meet certain criteria and obtain a 98% or higher sat-
isfaction rating from buyers during the previous month are designated 
as a “Power Seller.”59 This designation works well to achieve the goal of 
fair trading in two different ways. First, it motivates sellers to act fairly 
in all of their transactions to obtain the standard. And second, it almost 
guarantees that buyers will get a fair deal with a contract that is absent 
of hidden onerous terms.
In sum, eBay’s system of mutual feedback works extremely well in 
regulating transactions for consumer goods, and has been reproduced 
in many other marketplaces on the Internet.60 However, no such system 
has been implemented to protect consumers from service contracts on 
the Internet. As service contracts are rapidly expanding on the Internet, 
especially in the banking, insurance and gambling industries, other ac-
tion needs to be taken to protect consumers in these areas. 
58 See online: eBay <http://www.ebay.com>.
59 See online eBay <http://pages.ebay.com/services/buyandsell/welcome.html> for further de-
tails about the Power Seller system.
60 See for example online: BizRate <http://www.bizrate.com>. 
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V. CONCLUSION
7KHSUREOHPRIKXJHHOHFWURQLFFRQWUDFWVÀOOHGZLWKRQHURXVSURYLVLRQV
is very real, and is getting worse as contracts lengthen over time and 
eCommerce expands to encompass newer and more sophisticated indus-
tries. With no human customer-service representatives available online, 
powerless consumers are often left alone to decipher hugely complex 
contracts that may take lawyers hours to understand. 
This is a large-scale problem that cannot be adequately addressed 
by any one corrective measure. In light of Canadian courts’ refusal to 
DSSO\WKHSULQFLSOHRIVXIÀFLHQF\RIQRWLFHWRHOHFWURQLFFRQWUDFWVWKXV
far, increased attention must be paid to examining alternative means to 
achieve the same goal of consumer protection. Introducing domestic 
consumer protection legislation and creating an international consensus 
on consumer protection online could effectively address the problem, 
but these methods are typically frustrated and hindered by bureaucratic 
GHOD\VDQG WKHGLIÀFXOW\RI UHDFKLQJFRQVHQVXVDFURVVPDQ\ MXULVGLF-
tions. Another solution is to pressure industry to create voluntary stand-
ards. This could be effective, but this effort would be limited by industry 
motivation and the inherent inability for anyone to enforce these stand-
ards. Finally, Internet self-regulation has proven to be quite an effective 
and promising method of ensuring an equitable marketplace for goods 
purchased online; however, this method has thus far failed to respond to 
the rapidly emerging marketplace for online services.
It is clear that none of these solutions taken alone can adequately 
protect consumers from hidden onerous terms in online transactions 
in every circumstance. However, using a combination of these differ-
ent approaches and techniques could remedy the problem effectively. 
Therefore, until Canadian courts start applying a more rigorous and ex-
SDQGHG SULQFLSOH RI VXIÀFLHQF\ RI QRWLFH WR HOHFWURQLF FRQWUDFWV WKLV
multi-faceted approach will be the only way to ensure that consumers 
will be protected from onerous provisions hidden in absurd electronic 
contracts in the future.
